Abstract The pure exchange model is the foundation of the neoclassical theory of value, yet equilibrium predictions and models of price adjustment for this model remained untested prior to the experiment reported in this paper. With the exchange economy replicated several times, prices and allocations converge sharply to the competitive equilibrium in continuous double auction (CDA) trading. Convergence is evaluated by comparing the extent of price adjustment within each market replication (or trading period) to the extent of adjustment across trading periods: most observed price adjustment occurs within trading periods, so price adjustment data are evaluated with the Hahn process model (Hahn and Negishi [1962] ), which is a disequilibrium model of within-period trades. Estimation demonstrates that the model is consistent with observed price paths within each period of the exchange economy. The model is augmented with an additional assumption -based on observations from this experiment -that the initial trade price in period t + 1 is randomly drawn from the interval between the minimum and maximum trade prices in period t. The estimated within-period adjustment rule, combined with this across-period adjustment rule, generates price paths similar to data from an experiment session.
equilibrium price, so that the price path in each period better approximates the CE price. Eventually prices and allocations stabilize in the vicinity of the equilibrium price and allocation. Although price paths in markets with income effects have different characteristics than price paths in markets without income effects, both are consistent with the same adjustment process. This paper progresses through the steps outlined above. Section 2 describes the economic environment induced in the experiment sessions. Section 3 describes the CDA mechanism in the exchange economy context. Section 4 evaluates experiment data for across-period convergence and also compares across-period price adjustment to within-period price adjustment. Section 5 describes the within-period price adjustment from the Hahn process model, augmented with a simple acrossperiod price adjustment rule. Section 6 reports Hahn process model parameter estimates and a simulation of the adjustment process. Conclusions are drawn in Section 7.
Economic environment
At the beginning of each trading period, each buyer is endowed with 1800 units of the numeraire commodity (X), which is described to the buyer as currency. Buyers can use this numeraire commodity to purchase units of the commodity (Y ). Each seller is endowed with eighteen units of the commodity, which can be sold individually to acquire units of the numeraire commodity. The payoff of agent i is determined from the value of the constant elasticity of substitution utility function u i (x, y) = c i ((a i x) r i + (b i y) r i ) 1/r i , where x is the final allocation of currency (the numeraire commodity X) and y is the final allocation of the commodity (Y ) held by agent i at the end of a trading period. 3 In each period of an experiment session, each of six buyers (agent type B) has the same utility function u B (x, y) and endowment ω B = (1800, 0); each of six sellers (agent type S) has the same utility function u S (x, y) and endowment ω S = (0, 18). Table 1 shows the CES utility function parameters and the endowments of sellers and buyers. With ρ i = r i /(1 − r i ), the excess demand for Y of agent i is In order to implement an exchange economy experiment, each subject is provided with detailed specifications of his objective and of the exchange institution. The next section describes the CDA institution in the context of an exchange economy and describes the representation of the utility inducement technique to subjects.
The continuous double auction (CDA)
In the CDA, any seller may submit an ask at any time during a trading period. An ask, which is the seller's current report of the fewest units of the numeraire commodity that he is willing to accept for a unit of the commodity, is entered in the area on the seller's screen display labeled "Enter Ask," as in figure 1 . Similarly, a buyer's bid, which represents her current report of the most units of the numeraire commodity that she is willing to pay for a unit of the commodity, may be submitted at any time. An ask placed at or below the current high bid generates a trade at the bid price. A bid that meets or exceeds the current low ask yields a trade at the ask price.
A seller may make any number of asks, and may trade any number of units that is consistent with his commodity endowment. Similarly, a buyer may make any number of bids, and may trade any number of units that is consistent with her endowment of the numeraire commodity. Several specific rules are implemented in the version of the CDA used in this experiment. Of these, the most important is the "spread reduction rule," which requires that each new ask is below the current low ask and each new bid exceeds the current high bid. A seller has the option to remove any ask that he has previously made, provided his request to remove the ask is received before it results in a trade. Each seller is permitted a single ask in the market queue at any time. Any new ask by a seller replaces his previous ask if he has one in the queue. Each ask is the unit price offered for one unit: multiple unit trades are not permitted. Analogous restrictions apply to each buyer's bids. During each period, a queue on the seller's screen displays all current asks and bids (shown as the "Market Queue" in figure 1 ); each buyer's screen also displays both queues. When a seller successfully enters an ask into the ask queue, he receives a confirmation message in the "Messages" area of the screen display. This ask also appears in the "Unit Ask" row of the "Trade Summary" 
Profit (or utility) representation
Each market period is separated into three phases. During the preview phase, which lasts 60 seconds, and during the 180 second trading phase, a seller is able to enter "Price" and "Quantity"
into a "Profit Calculator," which appears on the lower right hand side of the seller screen in figure 1.
(The final phase is the 30 second review phase, when sellers and buyers have an opportunity to examine the results of the trading phase.) This Profit Calculator displays both a tabular and a graphical representation of the utility level that would result from a proposed trade. Examples of the Profit Calculator are shown for a seller and for a buyer in figure 2 , starting from the seller's and the buyer's initial endowments. When a subject enters data into the Price and Quantity boxes in this calculator and clicks "Update Table, " the profit (or utility) level is displayed in the center of the table for the allocation that would result from the proposed exchange. Profit levels are also displayed in the table for prices above and below the proposed price, and for quantities above and below the proposed quantity. In addition, the graph represents the "Current Allocation," the "Proposed Allocation" which would result from the proposed Price and Quantity, and the "Iso-profit Curve" (or indifference curve) that passes through the Proposed Allocation.
Instructions
The CDA mechanism and the representation of profit (or utility) levels are explained to subjects in a detailed interactive instruction set. Instructions describe each element of the seller's (or buyer's) trading screen independently, and then describe how elements relate to one another. There are points in the instruction set at which the seller or buyer is prompted for inputs, and there are eight interactive questions that must be answered correctly in order to proceed through the instructions.
The sequence of steps through the instructions is outlined in Appendix A.
Experiment sessions and experience
Experiment sessions York1, York2, and York3 were conducted at the University of York in the U.K. on June 7, 2001 . These three sessions had a total of thirty-six student subjects drawn from a wide range of backgrounds, including the physical and social sciences, the arts, and the humanities. Session Ariz1 was conducted at the University of Arizona on Nov. 16, 2001 with twelve undergraduate students recruited from across all majors. 5 Subjects in all exchange economy sessions had prior CDA experience in a session with a list of unit costs for each seller and a list of unit values for each buyer, rather than a utility function. Experience in a CDA with induced costs and values simplified subjects' learning tasks, since they were already familiar with the CDA market institution when they participated in the induced utility experiment. From the pool of 120 subjects at York who had experience in an induced cost and value CDA in the two weeks prior to sessions York1, York2, and York3, for the induced utility sessions we did not attempt to recruit the 20 subjects whose earnings were lowest as a fraction of equilibrium earnings in the induced cost and value sessions. A similar criterion was applied for session Ariz1. 5 In a fifth session, prices continued to decline between periods 10 and 15, after they had already fallen to the competitive equilibrium price. During these six periods, 22 units were sold by the sellers at a loss. Misunderstanding of the utility inducement technique, particularly by three sellers, led to their poor performance and to a large deviation from equilibrium. Since the supply exhibited by these sellers substantially exceeded the induced supply, analysis of the market requires a decision error variable in the regressions. This analysis though complicates the basic adjustment model, provides no additional insight into price dynamics, and doesn't alter the basic conclusions of the paper, so the fifth session is not evaluated in this paper.
It is not the failure to converge though that limits the usefulness of the data from the fifth session. An adjustment process could fail to converge, even though no subject trades at a loss. If price adjustment includes both lagged price changes (with positive coefficients) and the usual adjustment term from excess demand, then the price path may repeatedly overshoot the equilibrium and fail to converge. This would be an interesting outcome well worth analysis.
The failure to converge in the fifth session though did not result from an unanticipated adjustment dynamic like this, but rather from an apparent misunderstanding of the utility inducement technique by three sellers.
Convergence
This section assesses convergence of prices and allocations in four experiment sessions. Section 4.1 assesses convergence of individual allocations to the competitive equilibrium allocation. Section 4.2 applies the tatonnement price adjustment rule to evaluate across-period convergence of mean prices. Section 4.3, which compares the extent of across-period price convergence to the extent of withinperiod price convergence, demonstrates that most price adjustment occurs within trading periods.
This motivates the analysis of within-period adjustment in Sections 5 and 6.
Convergence of allocations across periods
Prices converge reliably in the exchange economy experiment sessions (with the exception of the session in which several subjects apparently misunderstood the utility inducement technique). With twelve agents and two commodities, the allocation space has twenty-four dimensions, so these diagrams substantially -though usefully -compress the data. Statistical evaluation of convergence of individual allocations to the competitive equilibrium allocations confirms the impression of convergence conveyed by these diagrams. Convergence is evaluated by measuring the distance between each trader's allocation and their competitive equilibrium allocation, and showing that these distances, averaged across traders, converge across periods.
Let (x t,i , y t,i ) be the period t final allocation for agent i and let (x * i , y * i ) be the equilibrium allocation for agent i. The metric used to measure the distance between the final allocation (x t , y t ) = ((x t,1 , y t,1 ), (x t,2 , y t,2 ), . . . , (x t,12 , y t,12 )) observed in period t and the equilibrium allo-
The rationale for this distance metric is straightforward: if trades take place at the equilibrium price p * = 91 and the final allocation of each trader falls short of or exceeds the equilibrium allocation by α units, then the distance between the allocation and the equilibrium allocation is α.
With the distance d((x t , y t ), (x * , y * )) denoted d t , convergence is evaluated with the regression equation d t = d 1 e −r ln t η t (where {η t } is a sequence of independent, identically distributed lognormal random variables). This can be expressed as the linear model ln and also shows estimates from the regression. 6 
Price convergence across periods: tatonnement
Across-period adjustment of average price is evaluated with the price adjustment rule from the tatonnement modelp t+1 =p t + b Z(p t ) + ǫ t+1 , where Z(p t ) is market excess demand atp t . If p t = p * then excess demand is zero, so the expected price in period t + 1 is the equilibrium price, but for an adjustment rate b > 0 that is not too large (overshooting is possible in the discrete version of the tatonnement model), and forp t = p * , the expected mean price in period t + 1 lies betweenp t and p * .
If there is no systematic adjustment in response to excess demand (b = 0), this adjustment process is the random walkp t+1 =p t + ǫ t+1 , and if b < 0 the process is non-stationary, so construction of hypothesis tests requires some caution. First, in order to formulate a test of the hypothesis b > 0 against the null hypothesis of a random walk (if b = 0) or a non-stationary process (if b < 0), the model needs to be formulated in first differences ∆p t+1 =p t+1 −p t , as
Formal adjustment test with linear approximation to excess demand
The model in equation (4.1) is similar to the "mean-reversion" model (or what in this context could naturally be called an "equilibrium reversion" model) ∆p t+1 = β (p * −p t ) + ǫ t+1 . The equilibrium p * is known to the experimenter and β (p * −p t ) is a linear approximation to b Z(p t ) around p * . Let
(In Section 4.1 d t is the distance between an allocation and the equilibrium allocation.
Hered t is the difference between the average price and the equilibrium price in period t.) Then the adjustment process can be expressed as
The Dickey-Fuller unit root test can be applied to the model in equation (4.2) to test the null hypothesis of a random walk (β = 0) or non-stationarity (β < 0) against the alternative hypothesis that price responds in the predicted direction to deviations from equilibrium. The standard DickeyFuller test procedure involves inclusion of a constant term β 0 , and the augmented procedure tests lagged dependent variables. The augmented model is tested, and insignificant lags are eliminated.
For the mean price sequences from the four experiment sessions, no lagged price change is significant, so the model ∆d t+1 = β 0 − βd t + ǫ t+1 is estimated. The t-statistics forβ 0 fall within the range (−2.179, 2.179) for sessions York1, York2, and York3, so the hypothesis of a constant term in the adjustment process is rejected for these three sessions using a standard t-test. 8 The null hypothesis of no adjustment due to price deviation from equilibrium is then tested in the model of equation (4.2), which doesn't include a constant term. For that model, the critical value of the t-statistic is the Dickey-Fuller test statistic τ = −1.95 for a test at the 95% confidence level. The second row for each session in table 3 shows estimates for this model and the t-statistic for the test of the null hypothesis that β = 0. For sessions York1, York2, and York3, the null hypothesis is rejected: adjustment in each case is significant and in the direction of equilibrium. 9 Results from session Ariz1 are somewhat mixed. The constant term is significant, and in the model with the constant term included, it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis that prices follow a random walk or a non-stationary process, since the adjustment term has the wrong sign. If attention is restricted to the last eight periods in Ariz1, when adjustment took place, the result differs. In parameter is small. 10 In this situation, the null hypothesis is frequently accepted when it is in fact false. Given this situation, it is noteworthy that the null hypothesis can be rejected for the first three sessions, and for the last eight periods of the session Ariz1. 
In equation (4.2) the regressord t passes through the origin with slope one. In equation (4.3) the regressor Z(d t + p * ) passes through the origin but its slope there is −0.1713. The functioñ
.1713 passes through the origin with slope one, so
is equivalent to equation (4.1) and it is tangent to equation
The Dickey-Fuller test statistic is not formally applicable to equation 
Three cases help interpret these measures of across-period and within-period price adjustment.
The first case involves only within-period adjustment, the second considers equal within-period and across-period adjustment, and the final one involves only across-period adjustment.
(1) If price adjusts within each period so that 
Hahn process dynamics
In the four experiment sessions, prices and allocations converge across periods to the competitive equilibrium. Since the magnitude of within-period price changes exceeds that of across-period price 12 In the first two periods of York2, the mean price moved away from the equilibrium price. In the fifteenth period of Ariz1, the mean price overshot the equilibrium price slightly, going fromp 14 = 90.1 top 15 = 93.6. Both these movements decrease the measures of within-period and the across-period price changes. Without these three periods, the measures areĀ a = 0.146 for across-period price adjustment andĀ w = 0.347 for within-period price adjustment.
With or without these three outliers, these measures indicate that there is substantially more price adjustment within periods than across periods. 
Hahn process description and notation
In an exchange economy with m commodities and n agents, each with a utility function u i (x, y) and an endowment ω i , prices in the Hahn process adjust in response to excess demand. Unlike tatonnement though, in the Hahn process, trade takes place as soon as a price is announced. In the continuous version of the Hahn process, the initial price vector is held constant during some time
interval [ 0, h], and subsequently (for t > h) prices adjusts continually in response to excess demand according to the ruleṗ(t) = c Z Y ( p(t)|x(t)), where x(t) is the allocation that results from all trades that have occurred along the price path ( p(s)) s∈(0, t) . Trades of the goods follow some ruleẋ i (t)
that satisfies three conditions: (1) the budget of each agent i balances (p(t) ·ẋ i (t) = 0); (2) the net flow of each commodity balances ( n i=1ẋ i (t) = 0); and (3) the executed trade increases the utility of at least one agent and does not decrease the utility of any agent (u i (x i (t) +ẋ i (t)) ≥ u i (x i (t)) for all i with strict inequality for at least one agent). Hahn and Negishi [1962] and Arrow and Hahn [1971, Chapter 13] demonstrate that this price adjustment process converges to a Pareto optimal allocation for any adjustment rate c and any trade process that satisfies the three indicated conditions. 13 
Discrete Hahn process price adjustment
A discrete version of this process adapts the model to the experiment. The discrete version with two commodities operates simply. At the announced price p t,k some buyer with excess demand at that price transfers p t,k units of the numeraire commodity to a seller, who in return transfers one 13 Their main claim though is that as adjustments approach their continuous limit, prices and allocations converge to a competitive equilibrium of the original economy. In the Scarf example, if price adjusts slowly and the trade quantity at each announced price is relatively large, the limit of both the price and the allocation differ from the competitive equilibrium allocation. On the other hand, if price adjustment is rapid and trade quantities are small, the process can converge, even in a single trading period, to the competitive equilibrium of the Scarf example.
Nevertheless, even if the theorem were stated and proven correctly, the result would only be applicable to economies much larger than the one in the experiment, due to the assumption in the Hahn process model that trades are very small relative to equilibrium net trades. In the experiment, convergence is to a Pareto optimal allocation within periods; convergence to the competitive equilibrium price and allocation takes place across periods.
unit of the other commodity to the buyer. With this adjustment process, rules (1) and (2) are met by construction; rule (3) is imposed in simulations by ending trade when there is no Pareto improving trade at the announced price. 14 The excess demand of each agent depends on his current allocation and on the market price, so implementation of the model requires an expression for the allocation of each trader in terms of his initial endowment and the interim allocation that results after each trade. Suppose that from the sequence P t,k = ( p t,1 , p t,2 , p t,3 , . . . , p t,k ) of the first k trades in period t, agent i has taken part in k i trades. These k i trades by agent i can be denoted P
. , p t,i k i
). The allocation for buyer i ∈ B can be written in terms of P
The allocation for seller i ∈ S is x t,k (P
In the discrete version of the Hahn process, price adjusts after each trade in response to aggregate excess demand. After trade k in period t, price adjusts so that
The estimation procedure in Section 6.2 uses the expression for excess demand from the right side of equation (5.1) as a regressor. Simulation uses estimates from the augmented version of this model, which includes statistically significant lagged price changes.
Initial prices in periods t = 2, 3, . . . , T
This section examines the distribution of initial prices in period t + 1 in terms of the range of prices in period t. The Hahn process estimation procedure does not capture this aspect of the adjustment process, so it is examined separately and combined with estimates of within-period adjustment in a twelve-period simulation in Section 6.3.
The within-period price path predicted by the Hahn process has two free parameters: the initial price p t,1 and the adjustment rate c. The model is adapted in this paper to account for the replications of the economy across trading periods by including a simple rule for setting the initial price in periods t = 2, 3, . . . , T . The initial price in period t is assumed to be a weighted average of the maximum price and the minimum price from period t − 1:
Forty-seven observations of a are obtained from the fifty-one periods in four experiment sessions.
In the four sessions, the median value of a was a 24 = 0.477. The mean wasâ = 0.476, its sample The distribution of a is shown on the left side in figure 6 . The data on the right side of the figure are simulated values of a for the forty-seven individual period price ranges from the experiment sessions. The data were generated by taking each of these forty-seven price ranges, selecting an (integer-valued) initial price for the next period uniformly from that interval, and then calculating the statistic a for that initial price. This was replicated twenty times to get a simulation of the distribution of initial prices. Based on the distribution of a from the experiment and the simulated distribution, it seems reasonable to augment the Hahn process price adjustment model for replicated market environments with the initial price in period t + 1 selected randomly from a uniform distribution on the interval between the minimum and the maximum price in period t. 15 
Hahn process estimation and simulation
With error terms added to predicted price adjustments, prices in period t evolve according to the
As with the tatonnement model, if c = 0 the adjustment process follows a random walk and if c < 0, the process is non-stationary. Consequently, the test for c > 0 must be conducted in first differences ∆p t,k+1 = p t,k+1 − p t,k as
Hahn process estimation with linear approximation to excess demand
As with the test of the tatonnement model, the model in equation (6. term, so we expect that the constant term will be rejected. The model also does not include lagged price changes, though that seems plausible. 16 With a constant term and lagged price adjustment, the model is
In this form, the hypothesis test γ > 0 is carried out by comparing the t-statistic from the parameter estimate to the critical value of the Dickey-Fuller test statistic for a unit-root process. 17 The number of lags can be examined either by a general-to-specific sequential rule or the Bayesian information criterion (BIC). The general-to-specific sequential rule begins with a large number of lags (set at q = 8 here), and then insignificant lags are eliminated with a standard t-test.
For the model with a constant and approximately 500 sample points, if the absolute value of the t-statistic is greater than 1.96 the hypothesis that a lagged price adjustment parameter β j equals zero can be rejected at the 5% significance level, using a standard t-test.
This test was used to eliminate insignificant lags. 18 (Only significant lags are reported in tables 5 and 6.) Once insignificant lags are eliminated, the hypothesis that the constant term is zero is tested with a standard t-test. Since the constant term is significant in York2, the test statistic τ µ = −2.87 is used to reject the hypothesis of no adjustment. 19 In the three sessions for which the constant term is rejected, the model is estimated without a constant to test for significance of the adjustment term. In each of these sessions, the adjustment term is significant with a p-value below 5% (Dickey-Fuller test statistic τ = −1.95). In fact, in sessions York1 and York3, it is significant with a p-value below 1% (Dickey-Fuller test statistic τ = −2.58). These results are all summarized in Table 5 , which shows parameter estimates for the model in equation (6.2). In session York2, which has a significant constant term, the null hypothesis of a unit root (no adjustment) is rejected. (The critical value of the Dickey-Fuller test with a constant term is τ µ = −3.44) at a p-value of 1%.) 
Hahn process estimation with excess demand
Equation (6.2) has the merit that it is specified so that the Dickey-Fuller tests apply to it. The model too is very similar to the Hahn process adjustment model, since Z Y ( p t,k ) is nearly linear in a fairly large region around the equilibrium price p * . As a consequence of this, the results from the model in equation (6.2) should be similar to the results from the model
Comparison is facilitated if, as with the unit root test for the tatonnement adjustment model, we make the change of variable d t,k = p t,k − p * and then setZ table 6 are interpreted similarly to those in table 5 . 
Construction of predicted price sequences
The sequence of predicted price changes ∆p t,k+1 for k = 1, 2, 3, . . . , K t from equation (6.4) with parameter estimates substituted into the equation can be used to generate the predicted price path from each session. The predicted price sequence is p t,1 , p t,2 + ∆p t,2 , p t,3 + ∆p t,3 , . . . , p t,K t + ∆p t,K t . (though the estimated path is often difficult to distinguish from the observed price path). Prices demonstrate a remarkably tendency toward the equilibrium, even in York2, which was so close to the equilibrium in the third period that the excess demand on a per capita basis was less than −0.133 units.
Hahn process simulation
Hahn process simulation with discrete trades in two commodities and replication of trading periods is fully specified by (1) an initial price p 1,1 in period 1; (2) the price adjustment rule in equation (6.3);
and (3) the initial price in periods t = 2, 3, . . . , T in equation (5.2). The price path through T periods is only a function of the initial price p 1,1 in period 1, the adjustment rate c, the coefficients β j on lagged price changes, and the random terms ǫ t,k and across-period adjustment terms a.
For a fixed value of c, a predicted price path for period t is determined starting from the initial price p t,1 . The predicted second price p t,2 is determined based on p t,1 and the adjustment rule in equation (6.3) . Subsequent predicted prices are determined iteratively.
The Hahn process model and its adaptation to the replicated economies of experiments can be brought together in a simulation of the process. Figure 9 shows the path of prices within and 
Conclusions
The pure exchange economy is the fundamental model in the neoclassical theory of value. Empirical assessment of the Generalized Axioms of Revealed Preference (GARP), as in Cox [1997] The augmented Hahn process price adjustment model estimated in this paper is broadly consistent with price adjustment in partial equilibrium environments that have been studied in numerous CDA experiments beginning with Smith [1962] . Experimentally, a partial equilibrium market environment is created in the laboratory by inducing values for buyers and costs for sellers. Gjerstad and Shachat [2007] demonstrate that any partial equilibrium environment can be generated from an exchange environment with quasi-linear utility functions, so the price adjustment model estimated in this paper should apply also to adjustment in CDA experiments with induced values and costs, since these too can be viewed as exchange economy environments. In partial equilibrium market experiments, during early periods prices typically come from one side of the equilibrium in a wide arc that approaches the equilibrium price. In each successive period prices tend to follow a flatter arc, with the initial price closer to the equilibrium price than in the previous period, and the final price in each period approaches the equilibrium price. In these partial equilibrium market environments, even when units trade at prices away from the competitive equilibrium price, the equilibrium price of the economy that remains after a disequilibrium trade is typically the same as or very close to the equilibrium price of the original economy. As a result, trade prices converge to the equilibrium price at the end of the first period. In the second period, prices typically fall in the range of period 1 prices (as in the Easley-Ledyard model). As this process proceeds across periods, prices converge to the equilibrium price, in the strict sense that prices are near the equilibrium price throughout the period, not just at the end of the period. 20
The exchange economy experiment provides strong evidence for convergence to competitive equilibrium, and also demonstrates the importance of within-period price adjustment. A third issue also motivates the experiment. Experimental evidence on price adjustment in standard partial shows the situation if trades continue at the same price until the allocation reaches D S . At that point, excess demand is the same as it was when the allocation was A, but individual incentives are much altered. Agent S has no more incentive to trade at the current price, and the cone of prices that support Pareto improving trades has narrowed considerably. Even when prices change over the course of a trading period, the change to excess demand is minor relative to the change in the cone of Pareto improving prices. So models based on excess demand neglect aspects of the exchange environment that will most likely prove to be important as incentive based models of price adjustment are developed. Models of this process, once developed, will almost certainly enhance further our understanding of the important problem of price dynamics in exchange economies. The sequence of steps through the screens is described below. The instruction summary below refers frequently to elements of the seller's screen, which is shown in figure 1 (p. 6) . The instructions for a buyer are similar. Direct experimenter interaction with subjects was kept to a minimum whenever possible, including sign-in, seating, and payment.
Screen 1: The subject's earnings are based on subject's decisions and the decisions of other participants.
Screen 2:
The subject is a seller throughout an experiment session that lasts for 12 trading periods (in the first three sessions) or 15 periods (in session Ariz1).
Screen 3:
The subject should not communicate with or distract others. The subject's data are anonymous. 
Screen 5:
There is a set of interactive instructions that follow this screen. The seller will know that he either has or has not completed instructions based on the status message at the top of his screen.
Screen 6: Each period of the session consists of a 60 second "Preview Phase", a "Trading Phase" of 180 seconds and a "Review Phase" of 30 seconds. A clock at the top of the screen ticks down to the end of each phase.
Screen 7:
The seller begins each period with eighteen units of the commodity. The current balance of both currency and commodity are shown throughout each trading period in the Current Allocation box on the seller's screen.
Screen 8:
The location and purpose of the "Profit Calculator" is described to the seller. Screen 26: The price determination rule is reviewed and the seller is informed that after two questions, a bid will be simulated that results in a trade with the current low ask.
Question 5:
The seller is asked whether a trade will result if a buyer now submits a bid that is below the current low ask.
Question 6:
The subject is asked what the trade price will be if a bid is submitted that meets or exceeds the current low ask.
Screen 27: A bid is simulated that generates another trade. (This trade is between a simulated seller and a simulated buyer, so the subject only sees public information regarding the trade, i.e., its price on the Market Transaction Prices graph.)
Screen 28: A new simulated bid appears in the Market Queue. The price determination rule is reviewed once more and the subject is asked two more questions (Questions 7 and 8).
Question 7:
The seller is asked whether a trade will result if he submits an ask that exceeds the current high bid.
Question 8:
The seller is asked what the trade price will be if he submits an ask that is below the current high bid.
Screen 29:
The seller is prompted to enter an ask that is at or below the current high bid, in order to produce a new trade.
Screen 30: Changes to the Current Allocation, Trade Summary, and other screen displays that result from the most recent trade are reviewed.
Screen 31: The seller is informed of the 'Vote to End Period' option, and the unanimity rule that triggers an early end to the trading phase of the current period.
Screen 32: A Period Profit window appears during the review phase of each period.
Screen 33: Subjects are cautioned that the ask by another seller and the bids by other buyers in the instructions were simulated and that these may not be similar to the responses by buyers and by other sellers during the experiment. The subject is informed that he has now completed the instructions and trading will begin when all subjects have completed their instructions.
Appendix B
Starting from the adjustment process model Equation (B.1) for period t (rather than for period t + 1) is ∆d t = −γd t−1 + u t . Solve this for u t to get u t = ∆d t + γd t−1 . When this is substituted into equation (B.2), the result is ∆d t+1 = −γd t + ρ (∆d t + γd t−1 ) + ǫ t+1 . 
